Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1969

Dean E. Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal Company, a
Corporation; Metropolitan Water District of
Orem, A Public Corporation, and Orem City, A
Municipal Corporation : Brief of DefendantsRespondents - Cross Appellants, Metropolitan
Water District of Orem and Orem City

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.H.V. Wentz and Joseph Novak; Attorneys for defendantsrespondents -cross appellants', Metropolitan Water District of Orem and Orem City
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Park v. Alta Ditch & Canal, No. 11345 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3478

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME CC>UaT.··~:-~~
...
' ' ·''
~-

OF THE

"/1'·,

;.!"

STATE OF UT.AH . ·" ,~\~:·
DEAN E. PARK,

Plai:n.tiff ONt Ap,.9"ti~'.

vs.

ALTA DITCH AND CANAL
a corporation,

Defe'IU/.4Jn,t

con
·

"/:;;.',-,:"'

t.ltlfl .,... .

METROPOLITAN WATER Dl&"'1
OF OREM, a public eorPOllrdiio
OREM CITY, a
..
Def

.

-~·

An Appeal From
District

Honorable l ..

EDWARD W. CLYDE

161 South State
hit Lake City, Utah Ul.11

ll. J. SKEEN

. ~~

622 Newho~ Buildit:lg
• 0 ·'~."
Salt Lake C1ty1 Utah..~ll
. _ · - ~~~'
Attorneys for ~I a4-u1nl1 U

KEITH E. TAYLOR

. ':~~j,
Jtearns Building _
'
lalt Lake City, Utah 14101
Attorney fO'I' tlefe"4nt • • .,...._._.
Alta Ditch & Canal C_,,..,,. .

"·1~1'~ ···~'

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE-----------------------DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------------------------RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL-------------------------------------STATEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------------------

1
2
3
3

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT HAS NO ENFORCEABLE
AGREEMENT WITH OREM FOR THE
USE OF ITS PIPELINE AND F ACILITIES TO CONVEY ANY WATER ------------------------ 15
POINT II.
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO DIVERT WATER DIRECTLY FROM THE
ALTA SPRINGS BY REASON OF HIS
OWNERSHIP OF 2 SHARES OF STOCK
IN THE ALTA COMPANY, OR OTHERWISE -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 0 R E M' S COUNTERCLAIM FOR
JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT
FOR THE REASONABLE VALUE OF
WATER DELIVERED BY OREM CITY
FR'OM ITS 14 INCH PIPELINE AND
USED BY APPELLANT DURING THE
PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 1, 1962 TO
OCTOBER 31, 1967 -------------------------------------------------- 33
CONCLUSION---------------------------------------------------------------------- 37

CASES CI'TED

Baird v. Upper Canal & Irrigation Company,
70 Utah 57, 257 Pac. 1060 ( 1927) ------------------------------ 28
Beggs et al v. Myton Canal & Irrigation Company
ct al, 54 Utah 120, 179 Pac. 984 (1919) -------------------- 30

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Genola Town v. Santaquin City et al, 96 Utah 88,
80 Pac. ( 2d) 930 ( 1938) ; rehearing
denied 96 Utah 104, 85 Pac. (2d) 790
( 1938) __________________________________________________________________ 23, 24, 27
Hyde Park Town 1!. Chambers, 99 Utah 118,
104 Pac. (2d) 220 (1939) -------------------------------------------In re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah (2d)
208, 271 Pac. (2d) 846 (1954) -----------------------------------Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah (2d) 193,
64 Pac. (2d) 418 (1961) ---------------------------------------------St. George City 1:. Kirkland et al, 17 Utah (2d)
292, 409 Pac. ( 2d) 970 ( 1966) -----------------------------------Thorley 'V. Kolob Fish & Game Club, 13 Utah (2d)
294, 373 Pac. (2d) 57 4 ( 1962) -----------------------------------Weight v. Miller, 16 Utah (2d) 112, 396 Pac.
( 2d) 626 ( 1964) ----------------------------------------------------------

23
21
21
28

21
21

TEXTS
J{ inney' s

Treaties on the Law of Irrigation, Volume
3, Chapter 75, Section 1480, page 2659 ______________________ 28

Kinney's Treatise on the Law of Irrigation,
Section 1482, Page 2662 ---------------------------------------------- 29

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND
ORDINANCES
Utah Constitution, Article XI Section 6 __________________ 22, 23, 28
Utah Code Annotated 1953
Section 10-8-14 _____________ -----------------------------------------------Section 25-5-1 ---------------------------------------------------------------Section 25-5-3 ---------------------------------------------------------------Section 25-5-4 ---------------------------------------------------------------Section 25-5-8 _________________ ----------------------------------------------O,rem City Revised Ordinances Section 28-3-1 -----------------

37
22
22
22
22
36

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DEAN E. PARK,
Plaintiff and Appell,ant,
vs.
ALTA DITCH AND CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent,
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF OREM, a public corporation; and
OREM CITY, a municipal corporation,
Defendants, Respondents
and Cross Appellants

Case No.
11,345

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Action by plaintiff-appellant to quiet title to
2/288ths of the waters of Alta Springs and to enjoin
all defendants-respondents from denying plaintiffappellant of the use of that flow and quantity of
water directly from the Alta Springs. By way of
counter-claim defendant-respondent Alta Ditch And
Canal Company sought an adjudication that the
Water Exchange and Rental Agreements entered
into among respondents covering the waters of the
Alta Springs were valid and that plaintiff-appellant
has been afforded all rights as a stockholder of defendant-respondent Alta Ditch And Canal Company.
By way of counter-claim defendants-respond1

ents-cross appellants Metropolitan vVater District of
Orem and Orem City sought an adjudication that
( 1) plaintiff has no right to convey any
water by means of Orem City's pipeline or its
other diversion and conveyance works and facilities;
( 2) plaintiff has no right to use or maintain the connection to Orem City's pipeline or
to take any water therefrom;
(3) plaintiff has no right to divert water
directly from Alta Springs; and
( 4) for judgment against plaintiff for the
sum of $1,834.45 for the reasonable value of
the water received by plaintiff from Orem
City's pipeline during the period from November 1, 1962 to October 31, 1967.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court
( 1) dismissed plaintiff's Amended Complaint with prejudice
and adjudicated that
(2) plaintiff's only right as against defendant Alta Ditch And Canal Company is as
the owner of 2 shares of stock of said defendant,
and plaintiff has been afforded all rights and
privileges thereunder;
( 3) the Pipeline and Water Rental Agree2

ments and the Exchange Agreements are valid
and in full force and effect and are binding on
plaintiff, and that plaintiff is not entitled to
divert any water directly from the Alta Springs;
( 4) plaintiff has no right to use or maintain the connection to the Orem City's pipeline
or to convey water through said pipeline or
through said defendant's other diversion works
and facilities;
( 5) defendant Orem City's counter-claim
against plaintiff for the reasonable value of
the water delivered by said defendant through
its pipeline and used by plaintiff from November 1, 1962 to October 31, 1967 be dismissed
with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-respondents-cross appellants Metropolitan Water District of Orem and Orem City seek
to affirm the Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law
and Judgment of the trial court as to paragraphs
Nos. ( 1 ) , ( 2) , ( 3) and ( 4) above and by way of
cross appeal to reverse paragraph No. (5) above,
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Orem
City and against plaintiff in the sum of $1,834.45
together with interest thereon.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These respondents shall follow the same nomenclature in referring to the parties as set forth in
3

Appellant's Brief, except when these respondents are
separately referred to Metropolitan Water District
of Orem will be designated "Orem District" and
Orem City will be designated by name.
Orem disagrees with appellant's Statement Of
Facts because it
( 1) contains essentially only those facts
carefully selected to be most favorable to plaintiff, who lost below, and thereby violates the
time-honored rule that the facts on this appeal
must be construed in the light most favorable
to defendants, who won below; and
(2) contains facts which are contrary to
the express findings of the trial court supported
by the evidence, without attacking those findings.
And so Orem makes the following Statement Of
Facts as found by the trial court and as supported
by the evidence, being directed primarily to the issues
between appellant and Orem.
The Alta Springs emerge from the ledges high
on the north wall of Provo Canyon, approximately
3 miles above its mouth, at an elevation of some 640
feet above the canyon floor ( Exh. 29, Tr. 202). The
original appropriators of the Alta Springs conveyed
the waters therefrom by means of a high line canal
through and around the ledges and thence steeply
down a mountain side ravine to the Orem Bench
into a ditch which coursed in a general northwesterly
4

direction along the easterly edge of their lands at
the base of the foothills ( Exhs. 28, 29, 30). Appellant's property is situated on an intermediate bench
approximately 150 feet higher in elevation than
where the Alta Ditch passes below his property (Tr.
54).
The early appropriators of the Alta Springs
organized the old Alta Ditch And Canal Company
as a corporation under Utah law on May 20, 1893
for a term of fifty ( 50) years ( Fdg. 2, R. 87; Exh.
26). The old charter expired on May 20, 1943, at
which time there were 288 shares of stock issued and
outstanding, of which Orem City owned 100 1/6th
shares ( Fdg. 3, R. 88).
Excluding Orem City, all of the remaining stockholders of the old Alta Company, owning 187 5/6ths
shares, re-incorporated into the new A'lta Company
and all of them (except Orem City) executed the
new Articles of Incorporation, including Verena C.
Crandall, the predecessor in interest of plaintiff
(Fdg. 4, R. 88; Fdg. 7, R. 89; Exh. 3). Orem City
refused to join the new Alta Company, which touched
off disputes over their respective rights in the distribution of water and the litigation encompassed in
Civil No. 15,460 ensued (Fdg. 5, R. 88; Exh. 3).
The end result of the litigation awarded Orem City
100 1/6th / 288ths (34.82%) of the waters of Alta
Springs in its own right and to take the whole stream
at the Orem headhouse on turns with all of the other
shareholders of the new Alta Company (Fdg. 5, R.
5

88, 89; Exh. 3, Order Approving Amendments To
Decree).
On November 4, 1945, being approximately one
year prior to the incorporation of the new Alta Company, Verena C. Crandall acquired 2 shares of stock
in the old Alta Company ( Fdg. 7, R. 88). In November of 1946 Verena C. Crandall subscribed to the
Articles of Incorporation of the new Alta Company
and thereby conveyed to the new Alta Company all
of her right, title and interest in the 2 shares of stock
and assets of the old Alta Company in exchange for
2 shares of stock in the new Alta Company ( Fdg. 7,
R. 88; Exh. 7). On May 5, 194 7 Verena C. Crandall
transferred her 2 shares of stock in the new Alta
Company to one Robert Calder, and in 1949 appellant acquired those 2 shares of stock from Calder.
However, the transfer was not made on the books
of the new Alta Company until March 7, 1951, when
Certificate No. 224 for 2 shares was issued to appellant (Fdg. 7, R. 88; Exh. 13, Tr. 91). Appellant's
predecessors used the water represented by said 2
shares of stock for irrigation purposes below the
Alta Ditch (Exh. 28, Tr. 198, 199).
On February 18, 1947 appellant and his wife
entered into an agreement with Orem City to purchase 5.03 acres of land comprising a part of appellant's subject property (Exhs. 27, 28, Tr. 219). The
agreement specifically provided that the conveyance
of the land was made only on condition that no water
r1ghts, either in pipeline extensions, culinary water
6

or irrigation water, shall be granted. Beginning
on August 30, 1948 appellant and the Orem City
Council engaged in a series of discussions pertaining
to the furnishing of water to appellant's property
(Exh. 12 - Minutes of Orem City Council). Those
Minutes make it abundantly clear that no mutual
understanding was ever reached between appellant
and Orem City respecting the furnishing of water
to appellant from Orem City's 14 inch pipeline. Appellant readily admits that no written agreement
was ever executed by the parties respecting the
furnishing of water to appellant from Orem City's
14 inch pipeline (Tr. 57), and the trial court so
found (Fdg. 10, R. 91).
use

During the year 1949 Orem City constructed
a 14 inch diameter pipeline from its headhouse down
the mountain side some 4,445 feet to one of its equalization and distribution steel tank reservoirs (Tr.
15, 18), together with other water diversion and conveyance works and facilities as an integral and necessary part of its water works system whereby the
waters to which Orem City is entitled from the Alta
Springs are diverted and conveyed by Orem City for
distribution and beneficial use by its inhabitants and
persons outside of its corporate limits (Fdg. 9, R. 90;
Exh. 28, 29). Sometime during the fall of 1949 appellant connected into the bottom of said 14 inch
pipeline at a point immediately above the steel tank
reservoir (Fdg. 9, R. 90). L. V. Beckman, then Orem
City Engineer, designed the connection and super7

vised the construction, which was made with the
understanding that appellant would pay for the
water (Tr. 42). Appellant paid the contractor for
making the connection (Tr. 12) and shortly thereafter constructed a 4 inch pipeline from the connection to his premises (Fdg. 9, R. 90). From 1949 to
1958 the Alta Springs water was divided between
Orem City and Alta on a turns basis (Tr. 34).
Vvhenever it was Orem City's turn appellant used
some water through the connection, the quantity of
which is unknown, for the watering of some lawn,
a few trees and some horses (Tr. 34, 35, 141). From
1949 to 1957 appellant leased the water represented
by 1 3/4ths shares of his 2 shares of stock to Howard Ferguson and Richard Anderson, both of whom
were stockholders of Alta (Tr. 143). The leased
water was used by them from the Alta Ditch on
turns (Tr. 143, 144).
On March 19, 1956 Orem and Alta entered into
a "Pipeline And Water Rental Agreement" (Exh. 4)
which essentially accomplished two things:
( 1) It provided for the joint construction
of a pipeline approximately 18,400 feet long
from the Orem headhouse to the Alta Springs,
with Orem to pay 34.82 % and Alta to pay
65.18% of the cost and expense thereof; and
(2) Orem was granted the right to use
all of Alta's share (65.18%) of the winter water
October 15 to May 1 of each year for twenty
8

years, for which Orem agreed to pay Alta the
sum of $5,000.00 per year.
As to both ( 1) and ( 2) above, appellant signed
a Waiver Of Notice of the meeting of the stockholders of Alta to consider and act on such agreement ( Exh. 17) and the trial court found that appellant is legally bound thereby (Fdg. 11, R. 91, 92).
As to ( 1) above, Alta's contribution was based
upon its total of 187 5/6ths shares of stock outstanding, which in~ludes the 2 shares of stock owned by
appellant. Appellant did not separately contribute
to the payment of such expenditures save and except
as a stockholder of Alta owning 2 shares of stock.
As to ( 2) above, Orem contracted for the total
of Alta's share of the winter water of the Alta
Springs based upon its total of 187 5/6ths shares of
outstanding stock, and again this includes the 2
shares of stock owned by appellant. Thus Orem
rented from Alta all of the winter waters of Alta
Springs which otherwise would be distributed to
Alta shareholders, including appellant with his 2
shares of stock.
On May 16, 1958 Orem and Alta entered into
a "Water Exchange Agreement" (Exh. 5) which
essentially accomplished two things:
(1) The Orem District agreed to deliver
to Alta up to 1350 acre feet of water on call during the irrigation season into the Alta Ditch,
and to pay Alta an additional $5,000.00 per
9

year. If Alta took less than 1350 acre feet per
year the Orem District agreed to pay Alta $5.00
per acre foot for each acre foot less than 1350
acre feet taken. The agreement was for ten
years.
( 2) Alta granted to Orem all of Alta's
share of the waters of Alta Springs during the
irrigation season (being approximately May 1
to October 15) based upon the total of 187
5/6ths shares of Alta stock outstanding, which
again includes the 2 shares of stock owned by
appellant.
The foregoing Agreement expired by its own
terms on November 1, 1965. On June 28, 1966 Orem
and Alta entered into a new Agreement, renewing
the prior summer Water Exchange Agreement for
an additional ten years, with some modifications
(Exh. 6). This Agreement granted Orem the right
to use all of Alta's share of the Alta Springs during
the irrigation season based upon Alta's 187 5/6ths
shares of outstanding stock, which included the 2
shares of stock owned by appellant. Orem agreed
to deliver to Alta Deer Creek water on call, or its
equivalent, in exchange therefor and to pay Alta
$5,000.00 annually. Thus Orem acquired by exchange all of Alta's share of the waters of Alta
Springs during the irrigation season which otherwise would be distributed to its stockholders, including appellant under his 2 shares of stock. The trial
court found that said Agreement was duly author10

ized and executed by the parties thereto and is valid
and is in full force and effect and is binding upon
plaintiff (Fdg. 12, R. 92).
In 1958 appellant replaced said 4 inch steel pipeline with a 6 inch transite pipeline and equipped the
same with a meter at a point where said 6 inch pipeline enters his property. Appellant did not consult
with representatives of either Alta or Orem concerning such change (Fdg. 9, R. 91).
The Minutes of the Orem City Council meetings
reflect no minute entries pertaining to appellant's
connection from October 12, 1949 until October 3,
1960. With the consummation of the Water Exchange Agreement between Orem and Alta in 1958
the whole of the Alta Springs was placed in the Orem
City water system continuously during the entire
year (Tr. 35). At about the same time appellant
moved his residence to the property in question.
Thereafter his uses increased (Tr. 144). Since Orem
had contracted with Alta for all of its share of the
Alta Springs, inquiries by the Orem City Council
were made as to the basis of appellant's connection
as reflected by the Minutes of October 3, 1960, October 17, 1960 and November 7, 1960. On May 8,
1961 appellant met with the Orem City Council to
discuss his water connection and represented to the
Council that he had an agreement with Orem City
to allow the City to use the 2 shares of Alta water in
exchange for the equivalent in culinary water from
11

the 14 inch pipeline (Exh. 12), which was not the
fact (Tr. 57, Fdg. 10, R. 91).
Having determined that no agreement respecting appellant's connection existed, on July 17, 1961
the Orem City Council decided that a contract should
be drawn up and City Attorney Wentz was instructed to draw one up - which he did, and which
was sent to appellant (Exh. 23). A draft of the
p1·oposed agreement was offered in evidence by appellant and was received ( Exh. 27). However, appellant emphatically denied that he ever received the
proposed agreement (Tr. 184). Yet H. V. Wentz
testified that appellant subsequently appeared at a
Council meeting and brought the proposed agreement
with him, but appellant refused to sign it (Tr. 183,
184). This is borne out by the Minutes of the meeting of October 16, 1961 (Exh. 12). At that meeting
appellant threatened that if the City did not agree
to his terms he would run his own line up to the
head of Alta, put in a tank, etc. ( Exh. 12).
This controversy continued until 1966 when the
Orem City Council brought the matter to a head by
notifying appellant that if the matter was not resolved by August 1, 1966 his connection would be
shut off (Exh. 12 - Minutes of August 1, 1966 and
August 8, 1966). The end result was that appellant
then commenced this action. Orem City permitted
the connection to remain pendente lite and filed its
Counterclaim for the reasonable value of water used
by appellant during the preceding four year period
12

<1ncl for all water used by him during the pendency
of this action ( R. 30, 31) .
During the early part of the irrigation season
of 1966 when no Water Exchange Agreement was in
effect, Orem and Alta went back to the turns basis of
dividing the waters of Alta Springs (Tr. 268). On
two separate occasions during that period appellant
was out of water in his pipeline. To accommodate
appellant the Orem City water master arranged with
the Alta water master to turn some water into the
Orem 14 inch pipeline such that it would flow down
and into appellant's pipeline so he could get a drink
(Tr. 269, 295).
Orem City is also the owner of 41 shares of stock
of the new Alta Company and the water represented
thereby is used from the Alta Ditch for irrigation
purposes on a turns basis, the same as other shareholders of Alta (Tr. 287, 288).
Appellant's meter was read periodically by the
Orem City water master beginning in 1960, with one
reading in 1960, six in 1961, one in 1962, three in
1963, none in 1964 and two in 1965. Beginning on
August 2, 1966 appellant's meter was read monthly
(Exh. 38). In 1963 appellant's meter became inoperative because gravel in the pipeline became lodged
in the meter, thereby preventing the impeller from
turning (Exh. 12 - November 4, 1963, Tr. 213).
Water continued to flow through the pipeline but
was not measured by the stopped meter. The meter
13
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reading showed that during the period from October
5, 1962 to August 1, 1966 a total of 9,189,200 gallons
of water was metered through appellant's meter,
which was less than the actual quantity used because
of the inoperative period of the meter (Tr. 213).
During the period from August 1, 1966 to October
31, 1967 a total of 5,307,000 gallons of water was
measured through appellant's meter, which is an
accurate measurement of the quantity of water actually used by appellant during that period (Exh. 38,
Tr. 259).
The water rates for all water sold and delivered
by Orem City, both within its corporate boundaries
and outside thereof, are fixed by ordinance. Ordinance No. 45 ( Exh. 35) was in effect from August
28, 1962 to August 5, 1963 when Ordinance No. 52
( Exh. 36) was adopted and remained in effect until
1\1.ay 9, 1966 when Ordinance No. 104 (Exh. 37)
was adopted and has remained in effect since. All
three ordinances recite that the rates fixed therein
are determined to be the reasonable value of the
water delivered and sold.
The witness James Twitchell applied the applicable rates as fixed by the above ordinances to the
quantities of water metered through appellant's
meter ( Exh. 38) and testified that the reasonable
value of the water delivered to appellant was (Tr.
273)
14

October 5, 1962 to
August 1, 1966
August 1, 1966 to
October 31, 1967

9,189,200 gallons

$1,249.85

5,307,000 gallons

614.60

Total $1,864.45
The testimony of the witness Twitchell stands uncontradicted in the record. Appellant did not attempt
to qualify the testimony of the witness Twitchell (Tr.
27 4) and offered no evidence contrary thereto. Yet
the trial court found in favor of appellant and
against Orem City on this issue ( Fdg. 17, R. 93) and
dismissed Orem's counterclaim therefor with prejudice ( R. 97) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A P PE LL ANT HAS NO ENFORCEABLE
AGREEMENT WITH OREM FOR THE USE
OF ITS PIPELINE AND FACILITIES TO CONVEY ANY WATER.

Under Point 5 of appellant's Brief he asserts
that he has a valid and enforceable agreement with
Orem for the use of its pipeline and facilities for the
carriage of what he contends to be his Alta Spring
water. Yet during the trial appellant's counsel advised the trial court that appellant was not seeking
a determination on whether appellant had an enforceable right to maintain his connection to the
Orem City 14 inch pipeline or to utilize the pipeline
to convey any water (Tr. 22, 23). Likewise, appellant's counsel advised the trial court that appellant
was not claiming an interest in or ownership of any
15

pipeline belonging to Orem City (Tr. 58).
Those issues were squarely raised in Orern's
Amended Counterclaim ( R. 67), wherein it sought
an adjudication that
( 1) plaintiff (appellant) has no right to
use or maintain the connection to Orem City's
14 inch pipeline or to take any water therefrom;
and
(2) plaintiff has no right to convey any
water by means of Orem City's 14 inch pipeline
or its other diversion works and conveyance facilities.
On these issues the trial court found that
( 1) appellant's connection to the Orem
City 14 inch pipeline and his use of water therefrom was permissive only, and that permissive
connection and permissive use of water have
been terminated (Fdg. 9, R. 91); and
(2) no agreement, either in writing or
otherwise, has been entered into between plaintiff (appellant) and defendants (Orem) or any
of them, granting to plaintiff any right to use
defendant Orem City's 14 inch pipeline or its
other diversion works or facilities to convey any
water from the Alta Springs to plaintiff's property (Fdg. 10, R. 91).
And based on those findings the trial court concluded that plaintiff has no right to use or maintain
a connection to Orem City's 14 inch pipeline or to
16

convey water through said pipeline or defendant
Orem City's other diversion works and conveyance
facilities (Concl. 9, R. 94, 95).
Appellant does not directly challenge the foregoing findings, nor does he urge that they are unsupported by the evidence. He simply ignores them and
merely talks about an "arrangement" which he concludes followed from the conduct of the parties.
We submit that such findings are clearly supported by the evidence. In fact there is no evidence
to the contrary. Even appellant's evidence supports
them. Thus appellant's own Exhibit 12, containing
excerpts from the Minutes of the Orem City Council
Meetings touching on this subject, clearly shows that
no mutual understanding was ever reached between
appellant and Orem City respecting the connection
or the delivery of water through appellant's connection. We so note from the early Minutes of August
30, 1948 that "the Council made no decision on the
matter;" and on September 20, 1948 that "it was
understood that Mr. Park would not have to pay for
the water used this year, but thereafter;" and on
October 12, 1949 that "Dean E. Park was present
to ask the Council to consider him tapping the 14
inch line .... He was told that it was felt that the
project could be worked out ... and that it would
probably be agreeable with the Council."
Shortly thereafter appellant's connection to the
14 inch Orem City pipeline was made for him by the
17

contractor who was then installing the 14 inch pipeline for Orem City (Tr. 30). Appellant paid the
contractor for the connection (Tr. 12). Appellant's
own witness, L. V. Beckman, then Orem City Engineer, who designed the connection and supervised the
construction testified that the connection was made
with the understanding that appellant would pay for
the water (Tr. 42).
From 1949 until 1958 appellant's use of the
water through his connection was limited to the
watering of some lawn, a few trees and some horses
(Tr. 141). In 1958 appellant moved his residence
onto the property and his uses increased to supplying his residence and the irrigation of approximately
10 acres of pasture land in addition to his lawns,
shrubs and the like (Tr. 144, 145). At about the
same time appellant replaced his 4 inch steel pipeline with a 6 inch transite pipeline and equipped the
same with a meter at a point where his 6 inch pipeline enters his property, without consulting with any
of the defendants (Fdg. 9, R. 91).
With the consummation of the Water Exchange
Agreement between Orem and Alta in 1958 the whole
of Alta Springs was placed in the Orem City water
system continuously during the entire year. Since
Orem had contracted with Alta for all of its share
of Alta Springs water, including the water represented by the 2 shares of stock owned by appellant,
inquiries were thereafter made by the Orem City
Council as to the basis of appellant's connection to
18

the Orem City 14 inch pipeline. Thereafter appellant repeatedly represented to the various City Councils that he had an agreement with Orem City to
maintain the connection and use the water (Exh. 12
- Minutes of October 3, 1960; October 17, 1960;
and May 8, 1961). Yet appellant, himself, testified
that the agreement he claims is represented only by
the Minutes of the Orem City Council and that noth1.ng was signed by him or Orem City (Tr. 57).
In July, 1961, after it was determined that no
agreement existed, the Orem City Council directed
City Attorney Wentz to draw up an agreement for
the Council's consideration and for the comment of
appellant (Exh. 12 - July 17, 1961). This Attorney \Ventz did ( Exh. 12 - August 28, 1961) and a
draft of the proposed agreement ( Exh. 27) was sent
to appellant with a cover letter dated September 22,
1961 ( Exh. 23), but appellant refused to sign it
(Exh. 12-0ctober 16, 1961, Tr. 179, 182, 183, 184).
In spite of the above appellant contends that
he has a valid and enforceable agreement with Orem
for the use of its pipeline and facilities and for the
carriage of what he contends to be his Alta Spring
water. Yet appellant cites no facts in evidence from
which it could be concluded that such an agreement
had ever been made. He merely talks about an "arrangement" as set forth in his proposal at the CouncH meeting held on October 12, 1949, which he quotes
verbatim on page 29 of his Brief, and says that he
and Orem City operated under that arrangement
19

for some seventeen years. If that were so, we ask
appellant why did he lease 1 3/4ths shares of his 2
shares to other stockholders of Alta during the
entire period from 1949 until 1957? Why then did
he not install his meter until 1958? and if the socalled "arrangement" was for him to obtain water for
i1 rigation purposes, which is all the Minute talks
about, what is the basis of his claim for culinary
water?
The fact is that appellant was permitted to hook
onto the Orem City 14 inch line with the understanding that appellant would pay for the water. Yet
appellant has never paid Orem City one cent for all
of the water he received from Orem City's 14 inch
pipeline (Tr. 143). Appellant was sent a minimum
bBl in July, 1961 (Tr. 234) but appellant denies he
received it (Tr. 137). Yet Orem City received a
letter from appellant's attorney relative to the bill
(Exh.12 -August 28, 1961). And the reason why
continued billings were not made is not because "both
parties were operating under the arrangement reflected in the Minutes," as suggested on page 30 of
Appellant's Brief, but was because the City Manager
instructed the billing department "to quit billing
Dean Park, because the City was negotiating and
settling this with Dean Park" (Tr. 242). However,
the matter was not settled and was finally brought
to a head in 1966 when the Orem City Council notified appellant that if the matter was not resolved by
August 1, 1966 his connection would be shut off
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(Exh. 12-August1, 1966; August 8, 1966). The
end result was that appellant commenced this action.
Upon the evidence as a whole the trial court
found the facts against appellant as to any claimed
agreement. And those findings, being amply supported by substantial evidence, should not be disturbed and must be affirmed on appeal under the
well known appellate rules Weight v. Miller, 16 Utah
(2d) 112, 396 Pac. (2d) 626 (1964); Thorley v.
Kolob FiBh & Game Club, 13 Utah (2d) 294, 373
Pac. (2d) 574 (1962); Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah
(2d) 193, 64 Pac. (2d) 418 (1961).
In addition to the above there are at least two
other reasons why appellant's argument must fall.
First, the alleged agreemen't which appellant contends
for must, to be enforceable, be in writing under the
Statute of Frauds which was pleaded (R. 64). Specifically the alleged agreement claims either
( 1) a water right or
(2) a contract for the perpetual delivery
of water and/or
(3) an agreement which by its terms cannot be performed within one year from the
alleged making thereof.
As to ( 1) and ( 2) above, a water right is considered to be an interest in real property. In re
Bmr River Drainage Area, 2 Utah (2d) 208, 271
Pac. (2d) 846 (1954). And so under (1) above,
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to be enforceable, the alleged agreement must be in
writing under the provisions of Section 25-5-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1953 as claiming an interest in real
property. Or if it properly comes under (2) above,
it is for the leasing for a longer period than one year
of an interest in real property and is governed by
Section 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. And in
any event the alleged agreement could not under
appellant's claimed terms be performed within one
year from its alleged making back in 1949. Section
25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Appellant concedes through his own testimony
that no written agreement was ever executed. As he
puts it, the agreement he claims is represented only
by the Minutes of the Orem City Council and nothing
was signed by him (Tr. 57). Nor will the principles
of part performance under Section 25-5-8, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 help appellant since what he did was
contrary to his own proposal, like leasing all but a
fraction of his 2 shares to third persons. His best
performance was to take all of the water he wanted
from Orem City's 14 inch pipeline without paying
one red cent therefor.
The second reason why the alleged agreement
must fail is because it would be in violation of Article
XI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, which in part
provides that
"No municipal corporation, shall directly
or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any
waterworks, vrnte1· rights, or sources of water
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supply novv, or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it; ... "
And so appellant's claimed agreement would result in a perpetual enforceable easement through
Orem City's 14 inch pipeline and diversion facilities
which would divest Orem City of an interest in that
part of its waterworks system. This would clearly
be in violation of the constitutional prohibition. Thus
in the case of Genola Town v. Santaquin City, et al,
96 Utah 88, 80 Pac. (2d) 930 (1938), rehearing
denied 96 Utah 104, 85 Pac. ( 2d) 790 ( 1938), this
Court held that an agreement by a municipal corporation to deliver a specified quantity of water in
perpetuity is a parting of a water right and is void
under Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah C<YYUJtitution
unless there is an exchange of water rights of equal
use value, which this Court found there to exist. It
was there pointed out that the foregoing constitutional provision should be narrowly or strictly construed since it was meant to secure to communities
their water systems and prohibit any sale or lease
to pri,·ate parties. Likewise in Hyde Park Town v.
Chambers, 99 Utah 118, 104 Pac. (2d) 220 (1939)
this Court held that a contract whereby the Town
acquired a right of way for its pipeline over private
property in exchange for granting the landowner a
right to tap the pipeline for his own use was void
as being in violation of Article XI, Section 6 of the
Utah Constitution.
Although appellant's counsel advised the trial
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court that appellant does not claim any interest in
or ownership of any pipeline belonging to Orem City
(Tr. 58), the effect of his claimed agreement is just
that, and as such would be clearly void. Apparently
what appellant suggests, without saying it, is that
Or-em City ought to be estopped from denying appellant the right to continue such connection. The trial
court specifically found against appellant on his
claim of estoppel ( Fdg. 15, R. 93) and concluded
that estoppel did not run as against Orem or Alta
(Concl. 5, R. 94). Nor does appellant anywhere in
his Brief assert a claim of estoppel as against Orem.
And in any event the law is against appellant on
that score. Thus, in the Genola Town case, supra,
this Court stated on page 937 of the Pacific Reporter
"While in some cases a party may be
estopped from taking advantage of the unconstitutionality of an act (Tite v. State Tax
Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 Pac. (2d) 734),
the representatives of a municipality must act
within their powers and the city cannot be
estopped from declaring its own acts unconstitutional."
We respectfully submit that both under the law
and the facts of this case there is no basis for appellant's claim that he has an enforceable agreement
with Orem City for the use of its pipeline and facilities for the carriage of any water, and the Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment of the trial court in that
respect must be affirmed.
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POINT II.
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO DIVERT
WATER DIRECTLY FROM THE ALTA
SPRINGS BY REASON OF HIS OWNERSHIP
OF 2 SHARES OF STOCK IN THE ALTA COMPANY, OR OTHERWISE.

Although this issue is one primarily between
appellant and Alta, it does involve Orem since with
the consummation of the Pipeline And Water Rental
Agreement in 1956 and the Water Exchange Agreements in 1958 and 1966 Orem has contracted with
Alta for all of Alta's share of the waters of Alta
Springs based upon its 187 5/6ths shares of stock,
which includes the 2 shares of stock owned by appellant. And so this issue is important to Orem since
if appellant were to prevail Orem did not receive
what it had contracted for with Alta.
Appellant contends on page 12 of his Brief that
he has two bases for his claim to ownership of a
pro-rata share of the waters of Alta Springs, i.e.
( 1) as a successor to a stockholder of the
old Alta Company; or
( 2) as the owner of 2 shares of stock in
the new Alta Company.
The trial court found squarely against appellant as to (1) above, to-wit:
"13. The rights of plaintiff (appellant)
to the use of water herein are represented by
and are limited to his rights as the owner of
2 shares of stock of defendant Alta Ditch &
Canal Company ...."
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Such finding is clearly supported by the evidence.
Thus appellant as the successor in interest to Verena
C. Crandall acquired only such rights as she had.
Verena C. Crandall was one of the new incorporators
of the new Alta Company and subscribed to the Articles of Incorporation as the owner of 2 shares of
stock ( Exh. 7). In so doing she conveyed and transferred to the new Alta Company all of her right,
title and interest in and to the Alta Springs and
other property there involved ( Exh. 7, Ar. XIV;
Exh. 3, para. 14 of Fdgs. of Fact). Not only is such
finding in this case supported by substantial evidence but it could not be otherwise.
As to (2) above, the trial court further found
" ... Said rights of plaintiff (appellant)
to the use of water as a stockholder of defendant Alta Ditch & Canal Company are in all
respects upon the same basis as other stockholders and are subject to the same terms, conditions and agreements .... " (Fdg. 13, R. 92)
Apparently appellant concedes that he is a stockholder in the new Alta Company since he argues at
length that by virtue of his stock ownership he is
the owner of an aliquot share of the waters of Alta
Springs. This he says comes about because the Alta
Company is a mutual irrigation company and as
such is only a corporate water master. He then cites
case after case which talk about mutual irrigation
companies, without comparing the charters of the
particular company with that of Alta. In so doing
he completely ignores the fact that when his prede26

cessor in interest, Verena C. Crandall, subscribed to
the Articles of Incorporation of the new Alta Company she, as all other subscribers, conveyed and
transferred all of her right, title and interest in and
to the waters of Alta Springs to the new Alta Company. This she acknowledged under Article XIV of
the Articles of Incorporation, and the court in Civil
No. 15460 expressly so found and appellant is bound
thereby, i.e.
"14 .... all of the individual users having
or claiming any stock in said old corporation
or any rights in the Alta Ditch or Springs,
except plaintiff (Orem City), at the time of
signing said Articles of Incorporation, conveyed and transferred to said new corporation
their right, title and interest in and to said
Alta water, springs and other property here
involved." (Emphasis added)
But even so, none of the cases cited by appellant
in his Brief hold that a shareholder in a so-called
mutual irrigation company is entitled to his pro-rata
or aliquot share of the waters from a specific source.
And in our research we have been unable to find
any case which so holds. Rather, those cases say
that shareholders of the so-called mutual irrigation
company are entitled to their pro-rata or aliquot
share of the waters distributed by the company,
whatever be their source, whether exchange waters
or otherwise.
Thus in Genol,a Town v. Santaquin City, et al,
96 Utah 88, 80 Pac. ( 2d) 930 ( 1938) , rehearing
27

denied 96 Utah 104, 85 Pac. (2d) 790 (1938), one
of the issues was whether the 60 shares of stock
in the Summit Creek Irrigation Company being exchanged for a continuous flow of water, plus other
considerations, was an exchange of water rights of
equal use value so as not to be violative of the constitutional prohibition contained in Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. In sustaining the
trial court's finding that such exchange was of equal
use value, this Court noted that a certificate of stock
in a mutual irrigation company is actually a water
right in the sense that it entitles the holder to an
aliquot share of the waters of the company according
to the method of distribution. Any inference by appellant that it carries with it the right to a particular
source of water is wholly unwarranted.
The case of St. George City v. Kirkland, et al,
17 Utah (2d) 292, 409 Pac. (2d) 970 ( 1966) does
nothing more than re-affirm the above and is of no
help to appellant here. Likewise the case of Baird
v. Upper Canal & Irrigation Company, 70 Utah 57,
257 Pac. 1060 (1927) is of no help to appellant here.
In fact, in the Baird case, supra, it was exchange
water for which she successfully sought to compel
her connection and the delivery of her aliquot share.
The most widely accepted definition of a "mutual water corporation" is that stated in Kinney's
Treatise on the Law Of Irrigation, Volume 3, Chapter 75, Section 1480, Page 2659 as follows:
"Mutual water corporations may be de28

fined as those private corporations which are
organized for the express purpose of furnishing water only to the shareholders thereof,
and not for profit, or hire."
\Vhether Alta fits that definition leaves some room
for doubt since it is being operated for a profit, i.e.
cash dividends on its stock. Be that as it may, the
relationship between private incorporated water
companies, whether organized as mutual corporations or as a corporation for profit or hire, is that
of contract; and the rights and duties of both parties
grow out of the contract implied in a subscription
for stock and construed by the provisions of their
charters or Articles of Incorporation. Ibid Kinney's,
Section 1482, Page 2662. Important here is the fundamental proposition stated by Kinney on page 2665
of his Treatise as follows:
"But whatever may be the basis of incorporation of these mutual companies, in the
absence of anything to the contrary in the
Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws, each
share of stock is ma.de the exact equivalent to
any other share; and each shareholder in such
company is entitled to that proportion of the
water carried through its ditch or canal that
the amount of his shares or stock bears to the
whole amount of the shares or stock of the
corporation." (Emphasis added)
And so, contrary to the foregoing fundamental
concepts, appellant urges on page 25 of his Brief
that his 2 shares of stock have been given a separate
status, and he urges upon this Court that he is en29

titled to use his water through a separate system fol'
a purpose different than the irrigation purposes
which Deer Creek water will serve just as well. And
so we ask, why, when his rights are based upon the
same contract as are other stockholders, and why,
when his 2 shares of stock are the exact equivalent
to any other 2 shares, should he be entitled to any
rights different from or superior to other shareholders or to enjoy a preferred and superior use of
water through a separate system? Neither fair play,
common sense or the fundamental principles of law
will permit such result. And we submit that appellant has cited no case, no authority nor any legal
principle to support his contention that he is entitled
to his share of the corporate water supply from the
Alta Springs.
Next appellant asserts that absent his consent
Alta could not contract away his right to take water
directly from the Alta Springs which had by common
consent and practice been given an independent
status. Yet appellant cites not a single case in support thereof. We say that appellant's rights as a
stockholder of Alta are no different than any other
stockholder, and his 2 shares of stock are the exact
equivalent of any other 2 shares of stock. And we
submit that the case of Beggs et al v. Myton Carwl
& Irrigation Company et al, 54 Utah 120, 179 Pac.
984 ( 1919) is controlling here and is clear authority
for the proposition that the Board of Directors, upon
confirmation of a vote of the majority of the out30

standing stock, can enter into binding agreements to
lease and exchange the waters of the corporation
and it does not require the unanimous consent of all
stockholders. The will of the majority controls, and
so long as there is no discrimination to the rights of
the minority as stockholders (as distinguished from·
claimed superior rights as appellant asserts here) the
action of the majority is binding on the corporation
~nd all stockholders thereof. The remedy of appellant, as a dissident minority stockholder, is to sell
his stock, for he, as a hold-out, cannot deprive the
majority of the shareholders of the benefits of the
lease and exchange agreements.
Under the Water Rental and Water Exchange
Agreements the stockholders of Alta get a guaranteed quantity of water in excess of what their share
from Alta Springs would otherwise be, and they get
the exchange waters when they want it on call, with
all of the benefits of storage in Deer Creek Reservoir.
Thus they don't have to take water when their lands
are still wet in the spring, nor when it rains, and
they can hold it in storage for use during the late
summer months, thereby giving them the diversity
in the crops which they raise. On top of that, they
get $10,000.00 per year. And when Orem contracted
with Alta it contracted for all of Alta's share of the
Alta Springs based upon its 187 5/6ths shares, which
includes the 2 shares of stock owned by appellant.
To adopt appellant's view would be to say that Orem
did not get what it contracted for, nor what it has
been paying for since 1956.
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It is true that the Alta Spring waters as now
gathered, transported and treated meets public health
standards for drinking purpose whereas the exchange Deer Creek waters as delivered in the Alta
Ditch do not. But that came about through the expenditure by Orem and Alta of some $32,000.00 in
covering the Alta Springs ( Exh. 31), to which appellant did not contribute one cent save and except as
a stockholder of Alta, plus the construction by Orem
of 4,445 feet of 14 inch pipeline from its headhouse
to its steel tank reservoir. We say that appellant has
had a "free ride" for far too many years and should
not be heard to complain upon its termination.

Be that as it may, the trial court from its advantaged position found (Fdg. 14, R. 93) that
"14. Plaintiff (appellant) was at all
times aware of the Pipeline and Water Rental
Agreement and the Water Exchange Agreements involved herein. He consented thereto,
made no objections thereto and benefited
therefrom. Even though plaintiff consented
thereto defendant Alta Ditch And Canal Company had the legal power to enter into the
Pipeline and Water Rental Agreement and
Water Exchange Agreements herein without
the consent of plaintiff. Said Pipeline and
Water Rental Agreement and Water Exchange Agreements are valid and in full force
and effect and are binding upon the plaintiff.''
And there being substantial evidence in the record
to support the foregoing Finding, it cannot be disturbed on appeal.
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Likewise the trial court correctly concluded
( Concl. 6, R. 94)
"6. That plaintiff (appellant) is not entitled to quiet title to any of the waters of Alta
Springs, is not entitled to divert any water
directly from Alta Springs and is not entitled
to injunctive relief as against any of the defendants herein."
The trial court then entered its judgment dismissing with prejudice the Amended Complaint of
Appellant (R. 94), which we submit was in all respects correct and proper and must be affirmed
herein.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
OREM'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR JUDGMENT
AGAINST APPELLANT FOR THE REASONABLE VALUE OF WATER DELIVERED BY
OREM CITY FROM ITS 14 INCH PIPELINE
AND USED BY APPELLANT DURING THE
PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 1, 1962 TO OCTOBER 31, 1967.

In Orem's original Counterclaim filed on November 18, 1966 Orem City made its claim against
appellant for the reasonable value of the water received by appellant from the Orem City pipeline
during the period from November 1, 1962 to October
31, 1966 and for the reasonable value of the water
received by appellant therefrom if he continued to
use the same during the pendency of this action ( R.
31). In Orem's Amended Counterclaim filed on November 13, 1967 Orem City made its claim against
appellant current to cover the period November 1,
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1962 to October 31, 1967 for the sum of $1,834.45
(R. 67, 68).
The trial court found against Orem on that part
of its Counterclaim (Fdg. 17, R. 93) and dismissed
Orem's claim with prejudice (R. 97). Orem timely
filed its Cross Appeal from the judgment of the trial
court in dismissing that part of Orem's Counterclaim (R. 107, 108).
The evidence is undisputed that during the period from October 5, 1962 to August 1, 1966 the
quantity of water delivered to appellant by Orem
City through the appellant's connection was at least
9,189,200 gallons (Exh. 38, Tr. 259, 272). Likewise
the evidence is undisputed that during the period
from August 1, 1966 to October 31, 1967 the quantity of water delivered to appellant by Orem City
through the appellant's connection was 5,307,000
gallons ( Exh. 38, Tr. 259). The meter readings from
which those quantities were determined are in evidence (Exh. 38) and are undisputed and apparently
are accepted by appellant. During part of the year
1963 appellant's meter was inoperative and only a
portion of the water actually passing through his
pipeline was measured thereby ( Exh. 12 - N overnber 3, 1963, Tr. 213, 279). However, Orem claims
payment only for the quantities actually metered.
Likewise the evidence is undisputed that the
applicable Orem City ordinances fix the rates as the
reasonable value of the water (Exhs. 35, 36, 37).
In fact Orem City is the only distributor of domestic
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[lnd municipal water in that area and of necessity its
rates fix the reasonable value. Furthermore, Ordinances Nos. 45, 52 and 104 (Exhs. 35, 36, 37) each
specifically provide that the rates thereby fixed are
declared to be reasonable and uniform with respect
to the class or type of service to be performed. The
rates applied to the water delivered to appellant are
those uniformly applied to all users of water from
the Orem City system situated outside of the corporate boundaries of Orem City. James Twitchell, witness for Orem City, applied the applicable rates
fixed by the respective Ordinances to the water delivered to appellant and testified that the reasonable
Yalue thereof (Tr. 273) is
October 5, 1962 to August 1, 1966,
9, 189,200 gallons ------------------------------ $1,249.85
August 1, 1966 to October 31, 1967
614.60
5,3 07, 000 gallons -----------------------------Total ________ $1,864.45
Appellant did not attempt by cross examination
to qualify or discredit the above (Tr. 274), nor did
he attempt to refute the same on rebuttal. Appellant's only answer was that during the period from
October 5, 1962 forward plaintiff's claimed entitlement to the Alta Springs would have exceeded the
above quantities by some 18,000,000 gallons. This
was supposedly computed by appellant's witness,
L. V. Beckman (Tr. 277), yet there was no evidence
that all of such alleged excess went into the Orem
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system and that such did not take into account the
fact that the appellant's meter was inoperative in
1963 (Tr. 278). Nor does it take into account the
times when Orem City turned the Alta Springs water
out of its system during run-off and rain storms and
the like.
More important is that appellant completely ignores the fact that Orem had contracted for and paid
Alta for all of such waters in cold, hard cash and
delivered appellant's share of the Alta Company's
water into the Alta Ditch. How then can appellant
be heard to say that Orem City had the use of his
water and is entitled to a set-off therefor? All other
stockholders of Alta receive their culinary water
from the Orem City system and they pay for it at
the rates fixed by the Ordinance (Tr. 289). And so
we ask, how can appellant expect to be treated otherwise? Not only that, but he expects a continuous
flow delivery of water which has been rendered fit
for drinking purposes through the efforts and expenditures of Orem and Alta and under pressure so
he cannot only use the same for domestic purposes
but to water when he wants to 10 acres of pasture
and lawns through a pressure sprinkler system and
not pay one red cent therefor. This in spite of the
fact that it is in violation of Section 28-3-1, Orem
City Revised Ordinances ( Exh. 34), which makes it
unlawful for any user of water from the Orem City
system to use the water taken therefrom for irrigation purposes.
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The fact is that appellant has had a "free ride"
for too many years and he, like anyone else, should
pay for the water he has received from the Orem
City system at the same rates as all other users similarly situated. Orem has always stood ready and
willing to deliver water to appellant through his
connection in accordance with the provisions of Section 10-8-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953. All Orem
asks is that appellant pay for the water he uses at
the same rate as all other users similarly situated.
We respectfully submit that the evidence is undisputed that appellant has had the use and benefit
of some 14,500,000 gallons of good quality domestic
water from the Orem City 14 inch pipeline, which
has an undisputed reasonable value of $1,864.45.
And the trial court having adjudicated that appellant was not entitled to any of the waters of the
Alta Springs, there is no basis upon which it could
find against Orem City on its claim for the reasonable value of the water delivered to appellant herein.
Accordingly, the trial court clearly committed error
mid we respectfully submit that the judgment must
be reversed in that respect with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Orem City and against appellant in the undisputed sum of $1,864.45.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the Findings Of
Fact, Conclusions Of Law and Judgment of the trial
court must be affirmed insofar as they
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( 1) dismissed plaintiff's Amended Complaint with prejudice
and adjudicated that
(2) plaintiff's only right as against defendant Alta Ditch & Canal Company is as the
owner of 2 shares of stock of said defendant and
plaintiff has been afforded all rights and privileges thereunder;
(3) the Pipeline and Water Rental Agreement and Exchange Agreements are valid and
in full force and effect and are binding on plaintiff, and that plaintiff is not entitled to divert
any water directly from Alta Springs; and
( 4) plaintiff has no right to use or maintain the connection to Orem City's pipeline or
to convey water through said pipeline or through
said defendant's other diversion works and facilities.
We respectfully submit that Finding Of Fact
No. 17 and Conclusion Of Law No. 10 respecting
Orem's Counterclaim for the reasonable value of the
water delivered by Orem City and used by plaintiff
herein must be set aside as being contrary to the
undisputed evidence and in conflict with the Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law that plaintiff
is not entitled to divert any water directly from Alta
Springs for use on his property herein. Accordingly,
the judgment of the trial court dismissing Orem
City's Counterclaim for the reasonable value of the
38

water delivered by Orem City from its 14 inch pipeline and used by appellant herein must be reversed
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Orem
City and against appellant in the undisputed sum
of $1,864.45 as the undisputed reasonable value of
the water delivered by Orem City and used by appellant herein.
Respectfully submitted
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